REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
1758 OF 2011
(Arising out of
S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5412 of 2008)
RAGHUVANSH DEWANCHAND BHASIN
-- APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.
-- RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
D.K. JAIN, J.:
Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, is
directed against the judgment and
order dated 26th November
2007, rendered by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, in
CRL.
W.P.
No.1086/2002. By the impugned
judgment, while allowing the writ
petition filed by the appellant,
alleging harassment on account of his
arrest on the strength of
a non-bailable warrant, which had been
cancelled, the High Court has
directed the delinquent police officer to
pay by way of costs to the appellant
an amount of `2,000/- from his
own account.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the
facts material for adjudication of the
present case, may be stated thus:
Some time in the year
2000, one, Mr. Prem Harchandrai filed a
complaint, being C.C. No. 163/P/2000,
against the appellant, a practicing
Advocate, under Section 324 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
"the IPC"), in relation to
some incident alleged to have taken place in the
`Radio Club' at Mumbai, considered to
be a club for the elite. When at a
preliminary stage, the case
came up for hearing before the Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 7th
August, 2002, finding the appellant
to be absent, the Court
issued a non-bailable warrant against him
returnable on 31st October,
2002. The warrant was forwarded to the
Colaba Police Station for execution.
However, on 12th August, 2002, on
appellant's putting in an
appearance before the Court, the warrant was
cancelled.
4. On 15th August, 2002, the
complainant approached the Colaba Police
Station and insisted on the arrest
of the appellant in pursuance of the
said non-bailable warrant.
Thereupon, respondent No. 2, who at that
point of time was posted as an
Inspector of Police at the Colaba Police
Station, directed a constable
to accompany the complainant, and
2
execute the warrant. When the
appellant was sought to be arrested, he
informed the constable that
the said warrant had already been
cancelled. However, as he
could not produce any documentary
evidence relating to cancellation of
warrant, the appellant was arrested
before a public gathering which had
assembled at the Radio Club, in
connection with the Independence day
celebrations. He was produced
before the duty Magistrate at
about 2 P.M., the same day. The
Magistrate directed the release
of the appellant. It appears that the
appellant obtained the
necessary confirmation about cancellation of
the warrant on the next day
i.e. 16th August 2002 and produced the
same before respondent No. 2
on the same day. Alleging malafides
and humiliation at the hands of
respondent No. 2, in collusion with the
complainant, the appellant
approached the High Court, inter-alia,
praying for suitable
disciplinary action against respondent No.2;
adequate compensation; damages
and costs by the said respondent
from his own pocket.
5. As aforesaid, the High Court, vide
impugned judgment has allowed
the writ petition, inter alia,
observing thus :
"We therefore, find that there
was no justification for issuance of
non-bailable warrant on 7th
August, 2002 merely because the
petitioner had remained absent in
Criminal Case No. 163/P/2000
(sic) by the Metropolitan
Magistrate. The Magistrate could have
issued either a notice or a
bailable warrant depending upon the
3
facts revealed from the records.
Once the warrant was cancelled
on 12th August, 2002, it
was necessary for the Court to
immediately communicate the
same to the concerned Police
authority so that no inconvenience
could have been caused to the
person against whom the warrant was
initially issued. Once the
warrant was sought to be executed
on holiday and the concerned
police officer was
categorically informed that the warrant had
already been cancelled and the
police officer being fully aware of
the circumstances and nature
of the case in which warrant had
been issued, it was necessary
for the police officer to ascertain
and to find out whether
the warrant which was sought to be
executed was still enforceable or
had already been cancelled and
not to rush to execute the warrant
in those circumstances and that
too on a holiday. Having
produced the necessary documents
confirming the cancellation of the
warrant much prior to the date
on which it was sought to be (sic)
enforced, it was the duty of the
police officer to tender
the necessary apology to the petitioner
for executing such warrant
on the holiday, and the concerned
officer having failed to
tender the apology it apparently shows
that he had not performed his duty
in the manner he was required
to perform as a responsible
police officer. Even the affidavit
filed by the respondent No. 2
nowhere discloses any repentance
for having executed the warrant
which was already cancelled. It
is a clear case of unnecessary
interference with the liberty of a
citizen."
6. Thus, having failed to get the
desired relief from the High Court, the
appellant is before us in this
appeal.
7. Arguing the case in person, it was
strenuously urged by the appellant
that having regard to the nature of
offence alleged against him, in the
first place, the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate erred in law
in issuing non-bailable
warrant in a routine manner, without
application of mind, merely because
the appellant had failed to appear
in court on 7th August 2002. It was
asserted that since neither Section
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70 nor Section 71 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
"the Code") uses the
expression "non-bailable" a Magistrate is not
authorised to issue
non-bailable warrant of arrest even when an
accused fails to appear in the
court. It was submitted that having held
that the respondent No.2 was
guilty of misconduct, the High Court
failed to punish the said respondent
under Sections 342 and 345 of the
IPC. It was argued that
the misconduct of respondent No.2 was so
high that he should have been
forthwith suspended from his job and
ordered to be tried in a competent
criminal court. According to the
appellant, the direction of the High
Court asking respondent No.2 to
pay an amount of `2,000/-
by way of cost to the appellant was no
justice at all and if a strict
action is not taken against such delinquent
officers, they will continue to
disregard the orders of the courts with
impunity.
8. Per contra, Mr. Jay Savla, learned
counsel appearing for respondent
No.2 submitted that since
the appellant was unable to furnish any
document or order to establish that
non-bailable warrant issued against
him by the court had been cancelled,
the police authorities were left
with no option and in fact were duty
bound to execute the same. It
was also urged that, as per the
prevalent practice, whenever any non-
bailable warrant is cancelled
by the court, either memo or order
5
addressed to the Senior
Inspector of Police of the concerned police
station is issued and forwarded
directly to the concerned police station
with a direction to return
the said warrant to the court. But in the
present case no such memo or order
in writing had been received at
the police station on or
before 15th August 2002, when it was
executed. Learned counsel submitted
that the said respondent having
performed his duty bona fide and in
good faith, in pursuance of order
issued by the court having
jurisdiction, the said respondent had not
committed any illegal act warranting
any action against him.
9. It needs little emphasis
that since the execution of a non-bailable
warrant directly involves
curtailment of liberty of a person, warrant of
arrest cannot be issued
mechanically, but only after recording
satisfaction that in the
facts and circumstances of the case, it is
warranted. The Courts have
to be extra-cautious and careful while
directing issue of
non-bailable warrant, else a wrongful detention
would amount to denial of
constitutional mandate envisaged in Article
21 of the Constitution of
India. At the same time, there is no
gainsaying that the welfare of an
individual must yield to that of the
community. Therefore, in order to
maintain rule of law and to keep
the society in functional harmony,
it is necessary to strike a balance
between an individual's
rights, liberties and privileges on the one
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hand, and the State on the other.
Indeed, it is a complex exercise. As
Justice Cardozo puts it "on
the one side is the social need that crime
shall be repressed. On the other,
the social need that law shall not be
flouted by the insolence of office.
There are dangers in any choice."
Be that as it may, it
is for the court, which is clothed with the
discretion to determine
whether the presence of an accused can be
secured by a bailable or
non-bailable warrant, to strike the balance
between the need of law
enforcement on the one hand and the
protection of the citizen from
highhandedness at the hands of the law
enforcement agencies on the other.
The power and jurisdiction of the
court to issue appropriate warrant
against an accused on his failure to
attend the court on the
date of hearing of the matter cannot be
disputed. Nevertheless, such
power has to be exercised judiciously
and not arbitrarily, having
regard, inter-alia, to the nature and
seriousness of the offence
involved; the past conduct of the accused;
his age and the possibility of his
absconding. (Also See: State of U.P.
Vs. Poosu & Anr.1).
10. In Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr.
Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.2,
a Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court cautioned that before
issuing non-bailable warrants,
the Courts should strike a balance
1 (1976) 3 SCC 1
2 (2007) 12 SCC 1
7
between societal interests and
personal liberty and exercise its
discretion cautiously. Enumerating
some of the circumstances which
the Court should bear in mind while
issuing non-bailable warrant, it
was observed:
"53. Non-bailable warrant
should be issued to bring a person
to court when summons or
bailable warrants would be
unlikely to have the desired result.
This could be when:
7 it is reasonable to believe
that the person will not
voluntarily appear in court;
or
7 the police authorities are
unable to find the person to
serve him with a summon; or
7 it is considered that the
person could harm someone if
not placed into custody
immediately.
54. As far as possible, if
the court is of the opinion that a
summon will suffice in getting the
appearance of the accused
in the court, the summon or the
bailable warrants should be
preferred. The warrants either
bailable or non-bailable
should never be issued without
proper scrutiny of facts and
complete application of mind,
due to the extremely serious
consequences and ramifications
which ensue on issuance of
warrants. The court must very carefully examine whether the
criminal complaint or FIR has not been filed with an oblique motive.
55. In complaint cases, at the first
instance, the court should
direct serving of the
summons along with the copy of the
complaint. If the accused seem to be
avoiding the summons,
the court, in the second
instance should issue bailable
warrant. In the third
instance, when the court is fully
satisfied that the accused is
avoiding the court's proceeding
intentionally, the process of
issuance of the non-bailable
warrant should be resorted to.
Personal liberty is paramount,
therefore, we caution courts at the
first and second instance
to refrain from issuing non-bailable
warrants."
8
11.We deferentially concur with these
directions, and emphasize that
since these directions flow from the
right to life and personal liberty,
enshrined in Articles 21 and 22(1)
of our Constitution, they need to be
strictly complied with. However, we
may hasten to add that these are
only broad guidelines and not rigid
rules of universal application when
facts and behavioral patterns
are bound to differ from case to case.
Since discretion in this
behalf is entrusted with the court, it is not
advisable to lay down
immutable formulae on the basis whereof
discretion could be exercised.
As aforesaid, it is for the court
concerned to assess the situation
and exercise discretion judiciously,
dispassionately and without
prejudice.
12.Viewed in this perspective, we
regret to note that in the present case,
having regard to nature of the
complaint against the appellant and his
stature in the community and the
fact that admittedly the appellant was
regularly attending the court
proceedings, it was not a fit case where
non-bailable warrant should have
been issued by the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate. In
our opinion, the attendance of the
appellant could have been secured by
issuing summons or at best by a
bailable warrant. We are,
therefore, in complete agreement with the
High Court that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, issuance of
non-bailable warrant was manifestly
unjustified.
9
13. We shall now advert to a more
anxious point, viz. the conduct of
respondent No.2, at whose
direction the warrant was executed. It
needs no emphasis that any
form of degrading treatment would fall
within the inhibition of Article 21
of the Constitution. In the present
case, respondent No.2 was aware that
the non-bailable warrant issued
on account of failure on the part of
the appellant to attend the court
proceedings on 7th August 2002, was
returnable only on 31st October
2002. Undoubtedly, respondent No.2
was duty bound to execute the
warrant as expeditiously as possible
but we are unable to fathom any
justifiable reason for the
urgency in executing the warrant on a
National holiday, more so when it had
been issued more than a week
ago and even the complaint against
the appellant was in relation to the
offence punishable under
Section 324 of the IPC. The complaint
related to the year 2000. At the
relevant time, the offence punishable
under Section 324 of the IPC was a
bailable offence. It is apparent
from the record that the
warrant was executed at the behest of the
complainant in order to
denigrate and humiliate the appellant at a
public place, in public view, during
the course of Independence day
celebrations at Radio Club. We are
convinced that respondent No.2, in
collusion with the complainant,
played with the personal liberty of the
appellant in a high handed
manner. The unfortunate sequel of an
unmindful action on the part
of respondent No.2 was that the
1
appellant, a practicing Advocate,
with no criminal history, remained in
police custody for quite
some time without any justification
whatsoever and suffered unwarranted
humiliation and degradation in
front of his fellow members
of the Club. Regrettably, he lost his
freedom though for a short
while, on the Independence day. Here
also, we agree with the
High Court that respondent No.2 did not
perform his duty in the
manner expected of a responsible police
officer. As a matter of
fact, being the guardian of the liberty of a
person, a heavy responsibility
devolved on him to ensure that his
office was not misused by the
complainant to settle personal scores.
The so-called urgency or promptness
in execution led to undesirable
interference with the liberty of the
appellant. Such a conduct cannot
receive a judicial imprimatur.
14. That takes us to the core
issue, namely, whether the appellant is
entitled to any compensation
for the humiliation and harassment
suffered by him on account
of the wrong perpetrated by respondent
No.2, in addition to what has been
awarded by the High Court. As
aforesaid, the grievance of the
appellant is that imposition of a fine of
`2,000/- on respondent No.2 is
grossly inadequate. His prayer is that
in addition to an adequate amount of
compensation, respondent No.2
1
should also be prosecuted
and proceeded against departmentally for
his wrongful confinement.
15.It is trite principle of law that in
matters involving infringement or
deprivation of a fundamental
right; abuse of process of law,
harassment etc., the courts
have ample power to award adequate
compensation to an aggrieved
person not only to remedy the wrong
done to him but also to serve as a
deterrent for the wrong doer.
16. In Rudul Sah Vs. State of Bihar
& Anr.3, Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ,
speaking for a Bench of
three learned Judges of this Court had
observed thus:
"One of the telling
ways in which the violation of that
right can reasonably be
prevented and due compliance
with the mandate of
Article 21 secured, is to mulct its
violators in the payment
of monetary compensation.
Administrative sclerosis
leading to flagrant infringements
of fundamental rights
cannot be corrected by any other
method open to the judiciary to
adopt."
17. In Bhim Singh, MLA Vs. State of
J & K & Ors.4, holding illegal
detention in police custody
of the petitioner Bhim Singh to be
violative of his rights under
Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution,
this Court, in exercise of
its power to award compensation under
Article 32, directed the
State to pay monetary compensation to the
3 (1983) 4 SCC 141
4 (1985) 4 SCC 677
1
petitioner. Relying on Rudal
Sah (supra), O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.
echoed the following views:
"When a person comes to us
with the complaint that he
has been arrested and
imprisoned with mischievous or
malicious intent and that
his constitutional and legal
rights were invaded, the
mischief or malice and the
invasion may not be washed away
or wished away by his
being set free. In
appropriate cases we have the
jurisdiction to compensate
the victim by awarding
suitable monetary
compensation".
18. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias
Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa &
Ors.5, clearing the doubt
and indicating the precise nature of the
constitutional remedy under
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to
award compensation for
contravention of fundamental rights, which
had arisen because of the
observation that "the petitioner could have
been relegated to the
ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to
compensation was factually
controversial" in Rudul Sah (supra), J.S.
Verma, J. (as His Lordship then
was) stated as under:
"It follows that
'a claim in public law for
compensation' for
contravention of human rights and
fundamental freedoms,
the protection of which is
guaranteed in the
Constitution, is an acknowledged
remedy for enforcement and
protection of such rights,
and such a claim
based on strict liability made by
resorting to a
constitutional remedy provided for the
enforcement of a
fundamental right is 'distinct from,
and in addition to,
the remedy in private law for
damages for the tort'
resulting from the contravention
of the fundamental
right. The defence of sovereign
5 (1993) 2 SCC 746
1
immunity being inapplicable,
and alien to the concept
of guarantee of
fundamental rights, there can be no
question of such a
defence being available in the
constitutional remedy. It
is this principle which
justifies award of
monetary compensation for
contravention of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, when that
is the only practicable mode
of redress available for the
contravention made by the
State or its servants in the
purported exercise of their
powers, and enforcement of
the fundamental right is
claimed by resort to the
remedy in public law under
the Constitution by recourse
to Articles 32 and 226 of
the Constitution. This is
what was indicated in Rudul
Sah and is the basis
of the subsequent decisions in
which compensation was
awarded under Articles 32
and 226 of the
Constitution, for contravention of
fundamental rights."
In the same decision, in his concurring
judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as
His Lordship then was), explaining the
scope and purpose of public law
proceedings and private law proceedings
stated as under:
"The public law
proceedings serve a different purpose
than the private law proceedings.
The relief of monetary
compensation, as exemplary
damages, in proceedings
under Article 32 by this Court or
under Article 226 by the
High Courts, for
established infringement of the
indefeasible right guaranteed
under Article 21 of the
Constitution is a remedy
available in public law and is
based on the strict
liability for contravention of the
guaranteed basic and
indefeasible rights of the citizen.
The purpose of public law is not
only to civilize public
power but also to assure the
citizen that they live under a
legal system which aims
to protect their interests and
preserve their rights.
Therefore, when the court moulds
the relief by granting
"compensation" in proceedings
under Article 32 or 226 of
the Constitution seeking
enforcement or protection of
fundamental rights, it does
so under the public law
by way of penalising the
1
wrongdoer and fixing the
liability for the public wrong
on the State which has failed in
its public duty to protect
the fundamental rights of
the citizen. The payment of
compensation in such cases is
not to be understood, as it
is generally understood in
a civil action for damages
under the private law
but in the broader sense of
providing relief by an order of
making 'monetary amends'
under the public law for the
wrong done due to breach of
public duty, of not
protecting the fundamental rights of
the citizen. The
compensation is in the nature of
'exemplary damages' awarded
against the wrongdoer for
the breach of its public
law duty and is independent of
the rights available to
the aggrieved party to claim
compensation under the private
law in an action based on
tort, through a suit
instituted in a court of competent
jurisdiction or/and prosecute
the offender under the penal
law."
19.The power and jurisdiction of this
Court and the High Courts to grant
monetary compensation in
exercise of its jurisdiction respectively
under Articles 32 and 226
of the Constitution of India to a victim
whose fundamental rights under
Article 21 of the Constitution are
violated are thus,
well-established. However, the question now is
whether on facts in hand,
the appellant is entitled to monetary
compensation in addition to what has
already been awarded to him by
the High Court. Having considered
the case in the light of the fact-
situation stated above, we are
of the opinion that the appellant does
not deserve further monetary
compensation.
20. It is true that the appellant not
only suffered humiliation in the public
gathering, and remained in judicial
custody for some time but we feel
1
that for what he had undergone on
15th August 2002, some blame lies
at his door as well. Being a
practicing Advocate himself, the appellant
was fully conversant with the court
procedure and, therefore, should
have procured a copy of memo/order
dated 12th August 2002, whereby
the non-bailable warrant was
cancelled by the court. As noticed
above, admittedly, the appellant
applied and obtained a copy of such
order only on 16th August
2002. Though the conduct of respondent
No.2 in arresting the appellant,
ignoring his plea that the non-bailable
warrant issued by the court in a
bailable offence had been cancelled,
deserves to be deplored, yet,
strictly speaking the action of respondent
No.2 in detaining the appellant on
the strength of the warrant in his
possession, perhaps motivated,
cannot be said to be per se without the
authority of law. In that view of
the matter, in our opinion, no other
action against respondent No.2 is
warranted. He has been sufficiently
reprimanded.
21.The last issue raised that remains
to be considered is whether the
Courts can at all issue a
warrant, called a "non-bailable" warrant
because no such terminology is found
in the Code as well as in Form 2
of the Second Schedule to the Code.
It is true that neither Section 70
nor Section 71, appearing in Chapter
VI of the Code, enumerating the
processes to compel appearance, as
also Form 2 uses the expression
1
like "non-bailable". Section
70 merely speaks of form of warrant of
arrest, and ordains that it
will remain in force until it is cancelled.
Similarly Section 71 talks of
discretionary power of Court to specify
about the security to be taken in case
the person is to be released on
his arrest pursuant to the execution of
the warrant issued under Section
70 of the Code. Sub-section (2) of
Section 71 of the Code specifies
the endorsements which can be made on a
warrant. Nevertheless, we
feel that the endorsement of
the expression "non-bailable" on a
warrant is to facilitate the
executing authority as well as the person
against whom the warrant is
sought to be executed to make them
aware as to the nature of
the warrant that has been issued. In our
view, merely because Form No.2,
issued under Section 476 of the
Code, and set forth in the
Second schedule, nowhere uses the
expression bailable or non-bailable
warrant, that does not prohibit the
Courts from using the said
word or expression while issuing the
warrant or even to make endorsement to
that effect on the warrant so
issued. Any endorsement/variation,
which is made on such warrant for
the benefit of the person
against whom the warrant is issued or the
persons who are required to execute the
warrant, would not render the
warrant to be bad in law. What
is material is that there is a power
vested in the Court to issue a warrant
and that power is to be exercised
judiciously depending upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.
1
Being so, merely because the
warrant uses the expression like "non-
bailable" and that such
terminology is not to be found in either Section
70 or Section 71 of the Code that by
itself cannot render the warrant
bad in law. The argument
is devoid of substance and is rejected
accordingly.
22.In view of the aforegoing
discussion, no ground is made out
warranting our interference with the
impugned judgment of the High
Court. We confirm the judgment and
dismiss the appeal accordingly,
but with no order as to costs.
23.However, before parting with the
judgment, we feel that in order to
prevent such a paradoxical
situation, we are faced with in the instant
case, and to check or obviate
the possibility of misuse of an arrest
warrant, in addition to the
statutory and constitutional requirements to
which reference has been made above,
it would be appropriate to issue
the following guidelines to be
adopted in all cases where non-bailable
warrants are issued by the Courts:-
(a) All the High Court
shall ensure that the Subordinate
Courts use printed and
machine numbered Form No.2
for issuing warrant of
arrest and each such form is duly
accounted for;
(b) Before authenticating,
the court must ensure that
complete particulars
of the case are mentioned on the
warrant;
1
(c) The presiding Judge of the court
(or responsible officer
specially authorized for
the purpose in case of High
Courts) issuing the
warrant should put his full and
legible signatures on the
process, also ensuring that
Court seal bearing complete
particulars of the Court is
prominently endorsed thereon;
(d) The Court must ensure
that warrant is directed to a
particular police officer
(or authority) and, unless
intended to be open-ended,
it must be returnable
whether executed or unexecuted,
on or before the date
specified therein;
(e) Every Court must maintain
a register (in the format
given below), in which
each warrant of arrest issued
must be entered chronologically
and the serial number
of such entry reflected
on the top right hand of the
process;
(f) No warrant of arrest
shall be issued without being
entered in the register
mentioned above and the
concerned court shall
periodically check/monitor the
same to confirm that
every such process is always
returned to the court with due
report and placed on the
record of the concerned case;
(g) A register similar to the one in
clause (e) supra shall be
maintained at the concerned
police station. The Station
House Officer of the
concerned Police Station shall
ensure that each warrant of
arrest issued by the Court,
when received is duly entered in
the said register and is
formally entrusted to a
responsible officer for
execution;
(h) Ordinarily, the Courts should
not give a long time for
return or execution of
warrants, as experience has
shown that warrants are prone to
misuse if they remain
in control of executing agencies
for long;
(i) On the date fixed for
the return of the warrant, the
Court must insist upon a
compliance report on the
action taken thereon by the
Station House Officer of the concerned Police Station or the Officer
In-charge of the concerned agency;
(j)
The report on such warrants must be clear, cogent and
legible and duly forwarded by a superior police officer,
so as to facilitate fixing of responsibility in
case of
misuse;
(k)
In the event of warrant for execution beyond
jurisdiction of the Court issuing it, procedure laid down
in Sections 78 and 79 of the Code must be strictly and
scrupulously followed; and
(l)
In the event of cancellation of the arrest warrant by the
Court, the order cancelling warrant shall be recorded in
the case file and the register maintained. A
copy
thereof shall be sent to the concerned authority,
requiring the process to be returned unexecuted
forthwith. The date of receipt of the unexecuted warrant
will be entered in the aforesaid registers. A
copy of
such order shall also be supplied to the accused.
Format of the Register
S. The Case title and
Name & The officer/ Date of Date
Date of Due Report The action Remarks
No. number particulars
particulars of person to judicial of
cancellat date of returned taken as
printed on
the person whom order issue ion,
if return on reported
the form
against whom directed directing any
used
warrant of Arrest
arrest is Warrant to
issued be issued
(accused/
witness)
24.We expect and
hope that all the High Courts will issue appropriate
directions
in this behalf to the Subordinate Courts, which shall
endeavour to
put into practice the aforesaid directions at the earliest,
preferably
within six months from today.
...........................................
(D.K. JAIN, J.)
............................................
(H.L. DATTU, J.)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 9, 2011.
RS
Labels---writ for compensation and damages and costs, Sections 342 and 345 of the IPC, duties of court while issuing NBW, procedure to issue NBW in compliant cases, compensation for wrongful detention by police, SC guidelines to lower courts on issuing NBWs